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Abstract 
The relationship between perspective taking abilities, political centrism, and outgroup 
derogation is not defined at this time. While previous research has demonstrated a 
negative relationship between political centrism and outgroup derogation (Van Prooijen, 
Krouwel, Boiten, & Eendebak, 2015), the relationship between the other variables is 
unclear. Therefore, the current study sought to measure the relationship between (1) 
perspective taking abilities and political centrism, (2) perspective taking and outgroup 
derogation, (3) political centrism and outgroup derogation and lastly, (4) whether the 
relationship between perspective taking abilities and political outgroup derogation would 
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Chapter I: Literature Review 
Currently, the divide between political parties is one of the largest schisms in 
America. According to a 2016 survey (Pew Research Center), Americans view politicians 
and members of the opposing political party with more anger, fear, and contempt than at 
any time in the last 25 years. Fifty-five percent of Democrats surveyed said the 
Republican Party makes them “afraid,” while 49% of Republicans reported the same 
feelings about the Democratic Party. Further research in 2017 (Pew Research Center), 
found that 45% of Republicans and 44% Democrats were willing to express very 
unfavorable opinions of the opposing party. It is important to note that these ratings have 
more than doubled since 1994, when under 20% of either party were willing to admit to 
expressing very unfavorable opinions about the opposing party (2017, Pew Research 
Center). 
The partisan divide has grown so large that it is surpassing other historical 
divisions, as evidenced by a 2015 study that found that partisan discrimination exceeds 
racial discrimination in some scenarios (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). An even more 
recent study by Iyengar, and Krupenkin (2018) strengthens these findings. These 
researchers found that since the 1980’s, partisan in-group favoritism and outgroup 
animosity have become strongly associated with one another, and dislike of the opposing 
political party has risen above the level of positive affect we have for our own group. 
This high level of disdain for one’s political opponents is causing a great deal of 
political animus, and contempt for the other side is a strong motivation for the 
participation of many in politics (Iyengar, & Krupenkin, 2018). All too often, voters will 
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rally against policies simply because the opposing party is promoting them. While filmed 
in a humorous manner, late-night comedian Jimmy Kimmel demonstrated this 
phenomenon well in his segment titled “Obamacare vs. Affordable Care Act.” In that 
piece, Americans vacillate between support or disapproval of the Affordable Care Act 
depending on their party affiliation and which name is used, despite the fact that it is the 
same piece of legislation. This anecdotal evidence is strengthened by the results of a 2012 
study (Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes) which suggested that American partisans increasingly 
despise each other, but exposure to negative campaign messaging exhibits stronger 
effects on division than true differences in policy attitudes.  
It is important to attempt to better understand why we have reached such a high 
level of political divisiveness. Spohr (2017) argues that recent technological advances 
and changing media consumption habits coupled with an increasingly partisan media 
landscape are at least partially to blame. Spohr (2017) is not the first to make such a 
claim. Sunstein (2001) predicted that the internet will increase political polarization by 
allowing individuals to participate in “echo-chambers” in which their current ideals are 
reinforced and strengthened and information that is contradictory to one’s worldview is 
either ignored or discounted. This idea is essentially an adaptation/evolution of 
Festinger’s (1957) concept of selective exposure/cognitive dissonance. Festinger 
proposed that people tend to avoid information conflicting with their own ideas and 
instead seek out messages they agree with in order to avoid psychological discomfort. 
There is evidence that Sunstein’s prediction has come to fruition. Stroud (2010) 
found evidence that partisan selective exposure leads to polarization, and that polarization 
may lead to selective exposure as well, forming a self-perpetuating cycle of ever-
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increasing partisanship. Also, Nie, Miller, Golde, Butler, and Winneg (2010) found that 
in general, individuals who consume news through both the internet and through 
television tend to be more partisan than individuals who primarily consume their news 
through television, and individuals who only consume news from the internet were the 
most partisan of all groups tested. Similarly, Tewksbury and Riles (2015) found a 
positive relationship between frequency of online news exposure and disagreements 
between Republicans and Democrats on various issues.  
It is important to better understand how the internet has caused us to reach this 
point. First, social media sites such as Twitter and Facebook are contributing to our 
division, and selective exposure is one of the likely mechanisms at work here. For 
example, there is evidence that we shield ourselves from political news/information we 
do not agree with on social media. Zhu, Skoric, and Shen (2017) report that 15.6% of 
respondents in their research either removed content or unfriended individuals during 
Hong Kong’s controversial Umbrella Movement protests of 2014. Selective sharing may 
be another complementary mechanism driving division as well: Shin and Thorson (2017) 
found that partisans selectively share fact-checking messages that agree with and promote 
their political views, while ignoring fact-checking messages that would hurt their cause.  
Second, while search engines such as Google, Bing, etc. are useful tools most 
internet users use to navigate the internet, they are not without their flaws either. Spohr 
(2017) argues that due to algorithmic curation and online personalization systems, the 
average internet user is rarely exposed to news content that is not aligned with their 
personal views. Specifically, on the most popular search engines, algorithms are designed 
to prioritize search results that are ideologically similar to our current views and they may 
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even exclude results that may oppose our views. This has pushed people into what some 
researchers call “filter bubbles” in which ideologically opposing views are filtered out 
(Flaxman, Gaol, & Rao, 2016). Concerns regarding filter bubbles have been extended to 
Facebook and other social media sites as well, as the algorithms they use to procure 
customized content such as videos and news may also limit an individual's exposure to 
diverse ideological views. However, while algorithms may be subtly influencing us in 
ways we are unaware of, our own personal preferences seem to be the dominant force. A 
2015 study (Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic) found that Facebook's algorithm can limit our 
exposure to opposing views, however, self-selection had a much stronger effect. 
Although search engines, and social media play a role in our news consumption, 
they are not necessarily the dominant channels in which news and political information is 
consumed online. A 2016 study (Flaxman, et al.,) examined online browsing habits of 
active news readers over a period of several months (Active news readers were defined as 
internet users who have read at least 10 substantive news articles and at least two opinion 
pieces in the three-month timeframe) they found that active news consumers tended to 
directly seek out news outlets, and preferred outlets that they agreed with ideologically. 
i.e. (conservatives preferred Fox News, liberals Huffington Post). Participants less often 
got their news from social media, search engines, or a news aggregator website.  
Lastly, although, the internet has been blamed for the rise in negative 
partisanship, there are other important factors as well. For much of the 20th century, 
television news programs strove to maintain neutrality. This is no longer the case, 
television stations such as Fox News cater to a specific political audience (Iyengar, Hahn, 
2009). In doing so, they may provide an incomplete set of facts or present biased 
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opinions to sway viewers towards a particular position. Viewers who frequently consume 
content from these stations may acquire an inaccurate view of the opposing political 
party, and/or may easily recall negative information regarding their political opposition 
due to availability bias (Spohr, 2017). Unsurprisingly, it has been shown that people tend 
to prefer news stations that they perceive to be the most ideologically similar to their own 
views. Specifically, Iyengar, Hahn, (2009) found that conservatives tended to prefer Fox 
News, while avoiding the news sources of CNN and NPR, while liberal participants 
preferred the exact opposite. In another complementary study  by Iyengar and Hahn 
(2008), researchers found that internet news consumption is often dictated by an 
individual's perceived agreement with the organizations ideology, that is, when exposed 
to the exact same article headline and image, conservatives were more likely to click on 
the link if it was provided by Fox News, whereas liberals strongly avoided Fox News and 
sought information from essentially any other source.  
Because we are easily able to confirm preconceived biases, and shield ourselves 
from information we disagree with, it is possible that individuals are failing or refusing to 
consider the perspective of others, which causes us to be more partisan, and to derogate 
individuals and groups with beliefs dissimilar to ours. If partisan, agenda driven media is 
in fact contributing to political division, it is important to understand some of the 
psychological processes that are involved. Understanding these mechanisms will ideally 
allow us to utilize our technological resources in a more beneficial manner. Accordingly, 
the focus of this review will be to examine the relationship between derogation of 
outgroups, perspective taking abilities, and how we align ourselves politically. 
Outgroup Derogation  
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While unfortunate, the lack of civility in politics is not particularly surprising 
given the results of previous research regarding intergroup conflict. Outgroup derogation 
is specifically defined as making or seeking negative evaluations of groups that one is not 
a member of, or displaying a preference for messages negatively characterizing outgroups 
(Jackson, Sullivan, Harnish, & Hodge, 1996). While in-group positivity/favoritism 
appears to be a core component of group membership, Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 
(2002), note that outgroup derogation is not a required element. They cite several studies 
suggesting that outgroup derogation and intergroup hostility generally arise when 
outgroups are associated with strong emotions (e.g., fear). Similarly, Branscombe and 
Wann (1994) found that when an individual’s valued social identity was threatened, 
derogation of a threat-relevant outgroup elevated collective self-esteem. In simple terms, 
we often speak negatively about our rivals when they make us feel insecure about 
ourselves and we feel better about our own group after doing so. These effects do not 
appear to be unique to America either; a European study found that perceptions of 
threatened group interests (i.e. school, culture) were causally antecedent to dislike and 
avoidance of foreigners and ethnic minorities. Essentially, perceiving an outgroup or its 
members as a threat to one’s own group caused individuals to act and feel negatively 
towards the outgroup or to avoid them altogether (Schlueter, Schmidt, & Wagner, 2008). 
Given these findings, it should not be surprising that the two sides of the political 
spectrum are having difficulty finding common ground. Due to partisan media messaging 
(Iyengar, & Hahn, 2009, Levendusky, 2013), both sides may view the other as an 
imminent and direct threat to the interests of their own group. Additionally, both sides of 
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the political spectrum have suffered electoral defeats in the past several years, which 
could potentially make them feel threatened and/or harm their self-esteem. 
Perspective Taking 
Perspective taking is a broadly defined concept. Ackerman (1996) describes it as 
an individual’s ability to experience and describe the presentation of an object or image 
from different vantage points. Therefore, perspective taking relates broadly to the 
Piagetian concept of egocentrism. Ford (1979) defined egocentrism as “an embeddedness 
in one’s own point of view.” This means that prior to a certain stage in development, we 
are unable to realize that another individual’s experience of the world is different from 
our own. As an example of this phenomenon, when asked to draw an object from the 
viewpoint of another person, young children are often unable to do so; instead, they 
usually draw the figure from their own visual perspective. However, the ability to draw 
from another person’s perspective develops quite early in life, and children usually do not 
fail this task by the time they have reached kindergarten (Salatas & Flavell, 1976). 
Accordingly, perspective taking is largely the antithesis of egocentrism. While 
Ackerman’s (1996) definition is not of central importance to the current research because 
it is a quite literal interpretation of perspective taking, involving visual images, as 
opposed to purely mental phenomena, it is still relevant because it highlights the fact that 
we do not always consider that others have mental experiences that differ from our own.  
Underwood and Moore (1982) divide perspective taking into three broad 
categories: perceptual, social-cognitive, and affective. However, they note that the 
constructs are obviously interrelated and utilize similar internal processes. The perceptual 
component of perspective taking is the aspect previously described by Ackerman, which 
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involves imagining the visual image another individual is viewing. The social-cognitive 
form involves imagining the thoughts or motives of another, while the affective 
component involves imagining the feelings or concerns of another. Similarly, Bensalah, 
Caillies, and Anduze (2016) divide perspective taking into affective components and 
cognitive components as well. 
Batson and Ahmad (2009) described two distinct but related forms of perspective 
taking: the imagine-self, and the imagine-other perspective. In the imagine-self 
perspective, an individual envisions how they personally would think and feel if they 
were in another person’s role. In the imagine-other perspective, a person imagines how 
the other individual would think and feel given a set of circumstances. The distinction is 
subtle, yet important, as the different types of perspective taking have unique 
psychological effects. The imagine-self perspective is related to reduced stereotyping and 
more positive evaluations of outgroups, while the imagine-other perspective is linked to 
increased readiness to help a specific outgroup and increased empathic concern for 
specific members of outgroups. 
When comparing perspective taking scores with scores on other-oriented and self-
oriented measures, perspective taking has been shown to be positively correlated with 
other-oriented sensitivity, yet negatively correlated with self-oriented sensitivity (Davis, 
1980). Davis (1980) notes that this pattern of results suggests that high perspective taking 
abilities are mediated by a genuine concern for others feelings and reactions as opposed 
to merely being concerned with how one is perceived by others; therefore, perspective 
taking should be conceptualized as a dimension of the larger construct of empathy. 
Predictably, there are multitudes of studies that describe the relationship between 
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perspective taking abilities and prosocial behavior/attitudes. For example, Davis (1983) 
found that individuals high in perspective taking ability reported less social dysfunction, 
were more socially competent, and exhibited higher levels of self-esteem. Additionally, 
Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) demonstrated that perspective-taking abilities play a role 
in reducing social biases. In a series of experiments, they found that higher levels of 
perspective taking were related to less stereotyping of outgroup members, increased 
overlap between the self and representations of the target group, lower levels of in-group 
favoritism, and more positive evaluations of the outgroup.  
In addition to being positively correlated with prosocial attitudes, perspective 
taking has been found to be related to prosocial behaviors. Shih, Wang, Trahan Bucher, 
and Stotzer (2009) found that perspective taking was related to reduced prejudice and 
discriminatory behavior against individual members of an outgroup, the authors 
hypothesized that this was due to the perspective taking manipulation increasing 
participants empathy towards members of the out-group. However, in that research, the 
out-group was relatively affectively neutral to the in-group (Asians vs. white Americans). 
It would be interesting to explore whether Shihs et al findings extend to outgroups that 
elicit very strong negative reactions (e.g. opposing political parties.) There is some 
research to suggest that this may be the case, as a 2014 study found that perspective 
taking was positively correlated with increased intergroup contact with members of 
negatively stereotyped groups (Wang, Kenneth, Ku & Galinsky, 2014). However, this 
research examined contact between different social classes, as opposed to differing 
political parties. Differing political parties may be more difficult to unite because most 
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individuals choose their party affiliation, as Iyengar and Westwood (2015) points out; 
this may cause others to “blame” them for their beliefs or behaviors. 
Political Centrism  
As previously noted, high levels of perspective taking abilities have been 
positively correlated with prosocial behaviors and attitudes (Davis, 1983), lower levels of 
prejudice (Shih et al., 2009), and increased intergroup contact of negatively stereotyped 
groups (Wang et al., 2014).  Therefore, it is important that we better our understanding of 
how an individual’s perspective taking abilities are involved in their willingness to 
cooperate with or listen to members of an opposing political party. Raising perspective 
taking abilities may be a key component in decreasing the high levels of animosity both 
parties have for each other and could help move American citizens towards a more 
centrist position that allows for using the best ideas from both political parties to govern. 
Woshinsky (2008) defines political centrism in the following way “centrism is the ideal 
or practice of promoting moderate policies that lie between different political extremes.” 
He further notes that this is most often conceptualized as part of the one-dimensional 
political spectrum of “left-right politics.” A centrist position seems to be associated with 
a less emotional approach to politics, as recent research has found that respondents at 
both extremes of the political spectrum tend to derogate certain outgroups more heavily 
than politically moderate respondents, and experience stronger negative emotions about 
politics, such as anger, fear, and disgust as well (Van Prooijen, Krouwel, Boiten, & 
Eendebak, 2015). 
Rivlin (2018) makes the case that fighting between the two political factions in 
the United States is advancing the narrow interests of each group, yet doing little to 
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advance our country, stating: “If the two parties do not work together to find common 
ground, we are doomed either to gridlock or wild swings in policy”(“In defense of 
centrists,” para. 3). Events such as the passage and attempted repeal of The Affordable 
Care Act, the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2018, or the confirmation of Supreme Court 
Justice Brett Kavanaugh are prime examples of the gridlock and policy swings Rivlin 
(2018) was referring to, in each scenario, one political party strongly supported the 
passage of a bill/confirmation, while the other strongly opposed it, and used all available 
means to prevent its passage or confirmation (Gramlich, 2016; Pew Research Center, 
2018a, 2018b). 
Summary 
Numerous studies have shown that perspective taking abilities are related to how 
one interacts with others (2016, Shih et al., 2009, Wang et al., 2014). That is, individuals 
high in this ability tend not to derogate outgroups and are generally more prosocial (Shih 
et al., 2009, Wang et al., 2014, Davis, 1983.) Therefore, an important aim of this study 
was measuring if this relationship applies to political outgroups. Another goal was to 
measure the relationship between an individual’s perspective taking abilities and their 
level of political centrism, due to the fact that centrists by definition are willing to work 
with dissimilar people, and see the value in different ideas, they are likely to be high in 
perspective taking abilities. Additionally, centrism has previously been shown to be 
related to lower levels of outgroup derogation (Van Proijen et al., 2015), that relationship 
was retested in this study. Due to this potential relationship, it was predicted that some of 
the hypothesized influence of perspective taking on lower levels of outgroup derogation 
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would be reduced when simultaneously taking political centrism into consideration (see 
Figure 1.).  
The current investigation sought to replicate and extend previous research by 
examining the relationship between levels of perspective taking, political centrism, and 
outgroup derogation, the following hypotheses were tested. 
H1: There will be a negative relationship between perspective taking abilities and 
outgroup derogation. 
H2A: There will be a positive relationship between perspective taking abilities and 
political centrism. 
H2B: There will be a negative relationship between political centrism and outgroup 
derogation. 
H3: The negative relationship between perspective taking and outgroup derogation will 
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Chapter II: Methodology 
Participants 
Participants were recruited through Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online 
crowdsourcing platform that allows researchers and others to recruit individuals to 
complete surveys and other tasks for financial compensation and/or other various 
incentives. Participation was limited to individuals who voted in the 2016 U.S. election, 
and participants received a small amount of financial compensation for their participation 
($.50). 
The average participant age was 42.5 years old. The sample identified as 
approximately 56% male, 42% female, and 2% answering other. Our sample was 
overwhelmingly Caucasian, with approximately 81% identifying as non-Hispanic White, 
the remainder identified as 9% Asian or Asian American, 7% Hispanic or Latino, and 3% 
Black or African American. 128 individuals responded to our survey, however, only 98 
provided us with analyzable data due to item omissions. Specifically, 15 individuals did 
not attempt the outgroup derogation measure, while the remaining 15 participants only 
completed the demographic section or did not even complete that portion of the survey, 
rendering their data unable to be used.  
Materials 
Upon choosing to participate in the survey and providing their consent, 
participants completed an online questionnaire (see Appendix I). The first section 
contained demographics items assessing age, gender, and racial/ethnic identity.  
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 Political Centrism The second section contained an item asking participants to 
rate themselves on a political scale ranging from 0 (Very Liberal) to 10 (Very 
Conservative). The midpoint of that scale (5) indicates political centrism (non-
partisanship), and was used as an “anchor”, thus a score of 5 would be recoded as a 0. 
The absolute value of the distance a participant’s response deviated from the midpoint 
was then used to indicate a participant’s level of centrism, thus, lower scores reflected 
greater levels of political centrism. In this section, we also included a screening question 
asking participants to indicate their political opposition. Participants who were vague 
about their opposition were excluded from analysis.  
Perspective Taking The third section of the questionnaire contained the 
Perspective Taking Scale, a subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 
1980, 1983) According to its author; the perspective taking (PT) scale measures the 
reported tendency to spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view of others in 
everyday life. The Perspective taking scale of the IRI contains seven Likert-scale items. 
Response options to the IRI ranged from A (does not describe me well) to E (describes 
me very well). Response options were coded to reflect a numerical score, and higher 
overall scores reflected greater levels of perspective taking ability.  
Outgroup Derogation This questionnaire is a version of a scale previously used 
to assess intergroup attitudes between a sample of African American and Jewish 
individuals (Fiebert, Horgan, & Peralta,1999), shortened and slightly modified to assess 
the attitudes individuals hold towards their political opposition. Response options were 
coded to reflect a numerical score, with higher scores indicating higher levels of outgroup 
derogation.  
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Procedure 
After being recruited from the Mturk website, participants were required to 
provide informed consent, participants were then directed to an online survey delivered 
using Lyceum Survey. They completed the measures described above. Upon completion 
of the surveys, participants were then directed to a debriefing page disclosing the 
purposes and hypotheses of the study and providing contact information to allow 
participants to request a report of the research findings from the researchers.
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Chapter III: Results 
Both political centrism and outgroup derogation exhibited positively skewed 
distributions but applying standard transformations (logarithmic and square root) did not 
substantively reduce this deviation from normality. Bootstrapping (performed to test H3) 
did not change the significance of any of the pathways in the mediation model. 
Hypotheses H1 was tested using a linear regression, in that analysis perspective 
taking was used as a predictor variable of political centrism. 
 Hypothesis H2A, and H2B were analyzed using separate linear regressions in 
which perspective taking and political centrism were used as predictors of outgroup 
derogation.  
We also tested Hypothesis 3; whether political centrism (non-partisanship) 
partially mediates the effect of perspective taking on outgroup derogation. This mediation 
model was tested with a path analysis using the Lavaan package in R version 3.6.0.  
Results 
Means, standard deviations, and reliability alphas (Cronbach) appear in Table 1. 
Correlations among the variables are shown in Table 2. The three hypotheses were tested 
via three linear regression analyses in which perspective taking and political centrism 
were incorporated as predictor variables of outgroup derogation, and perspective taking 
was tested as a predictor of political centrism. 
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Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Cronbach’s Alphas for the Dependent Measures 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Measure    Mean    SD  Alpha 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 PIQS   2.92   1.64    
 PTT   25.67              5.85  .88 
 ODQCT   31.38   6.07  .91 
 ODQLT  26.95   6.58  .95 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: PIQS= Level of centrism; PTT = Perspective taking total; ODQCT = Outgroup 
derogation conservative total; ODQLT = Outgroup derogation liberal total 
 
Table 2 
Correlations Among the Variables 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  PIQS   PTT   ODQT                                    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
PIQS    --         
PTT  .09      --     
ODQT  .17    -.04       --      
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: PIQS = Level of centrism; PTT = Perspective taking total; ODQT = Outgroup 
derogation total. 
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The first regression explored the relationship between participants’ level of 
perspective taking abilities and outgroup derogation. The effect of the predictor variables 
was not significant, F(1, 96) = .17, p = .68, inconsistent with Hypothesis 1, perspective 
taking did not account for a significant proportion of unique variance of outgroup 
derogation (t = -.41, p =.68). 
The second regression examined the relationship between political centrism and 
outgroup derogation. Contrary to expectations, level of centrism was found to not be a 
significant predictor of outgroup derogation, F(1, 96) = 2.79, p = .10 (t = 1.67, p = .10). 
Thus, Hypothesis 2 was not supported either. 
A third linear regression was performed to examine the relationship between an 
individual’s perspective taking abilities, and their level of political centrism. The 
relationship between perspective taking and an individual’s level of centrism was found 
to be non-significant as well, F(1, 96) = .71, p = .40 (t = .84, p = .40). 
Finally, a mediation analysis was conducted using the R package lavaan. This 
type of mediation analysis uses maximum likelihood estimation to compute parameter 
estimates for all paths simultaneously. Results for this analysis are depicted in Figure 2. 
No paths were significant. 
  


















.10 (.02) .37 (.59) 
0.08 (.11) 
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Chapter IV: Discussion
In this research it was hypothesized that perspective taking and political centrism would 
have a positive relationship with each other, and that these variables would each have a 
negative relationship with outgroup derogation, as well. We also hypothesized that the 
relationship between perspective taking and outgroup derogation would be partially 
mediated by political centrism. When tested, however, these relationships were not found 
among the variables. 
Although, previous studies have found a connection between perspective taking 
and outgroup derogation (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), as well as centrism and 
outgroup derogation (Van Prooijen, et al., 2015), the current research did not attain the 
same results. Additionally, the hypothesized relationship between perspective taking and 
political centrism was not found. There are multiple possibilities why the current study 
did not achieve the hypothesized results. Most importantly, due to time and financial 
constraints we were unable to gather data from a large sample of individuals. Although 
128 individuals responded to our survey, only 98 provided us with analyzable data due to 
item omissions and other data issues. This limited our statistical power to find significant 
results.  
Sampling issues aside, it is important to consider other important factors that may 
have affected our research. As noted by Iyengar and Westwood (2015), political 
affiliations are not like racial or class boundaries, we make a conscious decision to join a 
political party. Because we chose to be a member of our party, as opposed to being born 
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into it, individuals with the opposite political affiliation may be less understanding or 
sympathetic of our behaviors and beliefs. It is also noteworthy that partisans are more 
affectively polarized against one another than many groups previously sampled in 
perspective taking research, making them more likely to derogate their opposition 
(Hewstone et al., 2002). Previous research has used relatively neutral groups when 
examining perspective taking and intergroup relations, for example (Galinsky & 
Moskowitz, 2000) relied upon the minimal group paradigm to define an outgroup in their 
research. Finally, much of the previous research that has found a positive relationship 
between perspective taking and prosocial behavior required participants to complete 
some sort of task to prime or enhance perspective taking abilities, for example Wang et 
al., (2014), required participants to complete an essay of a day in the life of an outgroup 
member before measuring intergroup contact between outgroups. Our study differed in 
that it only contained a self-report measure of perspective taking abilities and did not 
encourage participants to see things from the opposition's point of view before measuring 
outgroup derogation. It is important not to overlook psychological reactivity and demand 
characteristics as determinants of the outcome of this research either. It is well 
established that research subjects tend to alter their behavior when under observation 
(McCarney et al., 2007), and our hypotheses may have been fairly obvious to the 
participants, this is most likely to have caused them to answer in ways they thought 
would confirm our hypotheses (Nichols, Maner, 2008). 
Despite the current research failing to find a link between perspective taking 
abilities, political centrism, and the derogation of one's political opposition, there is a 
dearth of research demonstrating that perspective taking abilities are related to positive 
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attitudes and behaviors (Wang et al., 2014, Shih et al., 2009).  As well as research 
suggesting that centrists experience fewer negative emotions than partisans (Van Proijen 
et al., 2015). Researchers seeking to continue this research would likely benefit from 
sampling a larger selection of participants due to the likely small effect of the predictor 
variables and trying to gather a sample that more accurately represents the American 
electorate. The procedure of soliciting participants through random address and phone 
number sampling used by the American National Election Survey (ANES) seems to be 
the gold standard for political research (DeBell, Amsbary, Meldener, Brock & Maisel, 
2018), if feasible this or a similar procedure would be ideal as it would gather a more 
representative sample. Future studies may also want to include a question asking 
participants to attempt to identify the studies hypotheses, our study hypotheses may have 
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Appendix II: Measures  
Demographics 
1. How do you describe yourself? (Check one) Male __ Female __ Other __ 
2. What is your age? ___ 
3. How would you describe yourself? (Check one) American Indian or Alaska 
Native __ Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander __ Asian or Asian American __ 
Black or African American __ Hispanic or Latino __ Non-Hispanic White 
(Caucasian) __ Other __ 
Political affiliation scale 
Please indicate where you would fall on a scale of political affiliation. 
() Strong Democrat 
() Weak Democrat 
() Lean Democrat 
() Independent  
() Lean Republican 
() Weak Republican 
() Strong Republican 
Political Opposition Question 
Please indicate the political group that you consider to be your "opposition"  
() Liberals 
() Conservatives  
() Other (Please indicate group in the space provided below)  
Political ideology scale 
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In politics, people sometimes talk about Liberal and Conservative. Where would you place 
YOURSELF on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means very Liberal and 10 means very 
Conservative? 










() 10-Very Conservative 
Perspective Taking Scale  
For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate letter on 
the scale: A (does not describe me well, B, C, D, or E (describes me well). READ EACH 
ITEM CAREFULLY BEFORE RESPONDING. Answer as honestly as you can. 
1) I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view.   
A) Does not describe me well __ B) __ C) __ D) __ E) Describes me well __ 
2) I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.   
A) Does not describe me well __ B) __ C) __ D) __ E) Describes me well __ 
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3) I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look 
from their perspective.  
A) Does not describe me well __ B) __ C) __ D) __ E) Describes me well __ 
4) If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other 
people's arguments. 
A)  Does not describe me well __ B) __ C) __ D) __ E) Describes me well __ 
5) I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. 
A)  Does not describe me well __ B) __ C) __ D) __ E) Describes me well __ 
6) When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while. 
A)  Does not describe me well __ B) __ C) __ D) __ E) Describes me well __  
7) Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their 
place. 
A)  Does not describe me well __ B) __ C) __ D) __ E) Describes me well __ 
Outgroup Derogation Scale 
Please answer the following questions with regards to the political group you affiliate the 
least with. I.e.  If you identify as a conservative/lean conservative, answer these questions 
with liberals in mind, and vice-versa. Individuals with no political affiliation should apply 
statements to both parties.      
1. Liberals (Conservatives) have too much power in the U.S. 
() Strongly agree, () agree, () disagree, () strongly disagree 
2. Liberals (Conservatives) are warm and friendly people.  
() Strongly agree, () agree, () disagree, () strongly disagree 
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3. Liberals (Conservatives) are more willing than most to use shady practices to get 
what they want.  
() Strongly agree, () agree, () disagree, () strongly disagree 
4. Liberals (Conservatives) stick together too much. 
() Strongly agree, () agree, () disagree, () strongly disagree 
5. Liberals (Conservatives) don’t care what happens to anyone but their own kind.  
() Strongly agree, () agree, () disagree, () strongly disagree 
6. The more contact a person has with Liberals (Conservatives) the more they get to 
like them.  
() Strongly agree, () agree, () disagree, () strongly disagree 
7. Liberals (Conservatives) are too pushy. 
() Strongly agree, () agree, () disagree, () strongly disagree 
8. Do you feel that Liberals (Conservatives) are trying to get ahead at the expense of 
people like you? 
() Strongly agree, () agree, () disagree, () strongly disagree 
9. I try to avoid socializing with Liberals (Conservatives). 
() Strongly agree, () agree, () disagree, () strongly disagree 
10. I would not feel comfortable if most of my coworkers were Liberals 
(Conservatives). () Strongly agree, () agree, () disagree, () strongly disagree 
11. I would not mind if my immediate supervisor at work was Liberal (Conservative).  
() Strongly agree, () agree, () disagree, () strongly disagree 
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